F
ourteen years have elapsed since Craig Venter and others at the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) described a promising new method for sequencing the human genome that relied upon creating libraries of DNA fragments of genes expressed in a particular tissue under particular conditions 1 . High-speed, automated methods could be used to sequence the fragments, which were called expressed sequence tags, or ESTs. ESTs generally do not encode a complete protein or perhaps even any part of a protein.
Nevertheless, businesses were established in the 1990s based upon providing access to databases containing EST sequences, among other information.
Aside from their use in speeding genome sequencing and research, ESTs were of interest because, it was hoped by some, that they could form the basis of patent applications that claimed not only the ESTs but also any gene associated with the ESTs, any protein encoded by the genes, and incredibly, any antibodies that bound to the proteins. Indeed, the NIH itself filed the first patent applications claiming expressed sequence tags in 1991, provoking great controversy among biomedical researchers, including many working on the Human Genome Project, because of the perception that broad EST patents would inhibit research on gene function. In 1992, James Watson resigned as the director of the Genome Project in dispute with the agency's then leadership on the patenting question 2 . The NIH later reversed its position on EST patents and abandoned its applications. However, other organizations filed similar patent applications in the 1990s and maintained those filings 3 .
Unlike fully sequenced genes with known and exploitable functions, an EST indicates nothing about the full sequence or function of the transcribed nucleic acid with which it is associated. As recently noted: "The most obvious value of ESTs was not the speculative value of particular gene fragments for therapeutic or diagnostic uses, but the immediate value of growing collections of such sequences for use in gene discovery. With this shift, patenting genes started to look less like patenting end products and more like patenting scientific information" 4 .
Biomedical researchers, patient advocates and others, hoping to maintain open access to genomic information and materials, advocated against granting EST patents, based, among other arguments, on assertions that EST patents did not meet the "utility" requirement of US patent law. The utility requirement has been the subject of extensive court interpretation, including most importantly the 1966 US Supreme Court case of Brenner v. Manson 5 . However, the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) initially reasoned that ESTs and other gene fragments could meet the utility requirement as biochemical "probes" or generally as "research tools" 6 .
By 1999, however, partly in response to continuing questions about the patentability of ESTs, the PTO drafted proposed guidelines that it would use to determine whether inventions met the utility requirement, and requested comments from the public 7 . Accompanying the proposed guidelines were examples demonstrating their use, including one that would have found that an EST-based invention did not meet the utility requirement 8 . An eloquent statement supporting the adoption of the guidelines came from Bruce Alberts, then president of the National Academies of Science, who quoted Brenner: "The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point-where specific benefit exists in currently available form-there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field" 9 .
With respect to application of the proposed guidelines to EST-based patents, Alberts argued that "[t]hose who would patent human DNA sequences without real knowledge of their utility are staking claims not only to what little they know at the moment, but also to everything that might later be discovered about the genes and proteins associated with the sequence. They are, in effect, laying claim to a function or use that does not yet exist."
The PTO implemented its Utility Examination 
Fisher's claim
Fisher and Lalgudi (collectively "Fisher") were scientists at Monsanto who filed a patent application that disclosed approximately 32,000 specific nucleotide sequences for ESTs from various maize tissues. The application failed to disclose any information about coding sequences associated with these ESTs or about the proteins that they encode. During patent prosecution, the PTO limited Monsanto to five ESTs, and the only claim in the application read: "A substantially purified nucleic acid molecule that encodes a maize protein or fragment thereof comprising a nucleic acid sequence selected from the group consisting of SEQ ID NO:1 through SEQ ID NO:5."
Although the claim refers to five specific nucleic acid sequences, the claim is much broader than merely five ESTs because it uses the open-ended transition "comprising." The claim would cover any purified nucleic acid that includes any one of the five ESTs so long as the nucleic acid (but not necessarily its EST portion) encodes a maize protein or even a fragment of a maize protein. The claim would permit Monsanto to prevent others from making or using any nucleic acid molecule that encodes any maize protein so long as the nucleic acid includes one of the five EST sequences. This would include nucleic acids that encode the five maize proteins most nearly associated with each of the five ESTs, but also could include many other portions of the maize genome, including, at the extreme, whole chromosomes. Such a claim could be used to prevent basic genomic research over extensive areas of the maize genome, or to deny the ability to use the associated proteins, say as targets for product screening.
The appeals
The PTO examiner rejected the application for lack of utility, enablement and written description-three requirements for a valid patent (the enablement rejection was, in this case, a direct consequence of the utility rejection, because one cannot teach how to use an invention that lacks patentable utility). Monsanto appealed the rejection to the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and the board affirmed the rejection for lack of utility and enablement, but reversed the rejection based on lack of written description. Monsanto then appealed to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Monsanto argued that each of the five ESTs could be used as a research probe-reminiscent of the PTO's original position-to screen a cDNA library for the unique gene sequence corresponding to the ESTs, even without knowing the encoded protein's utility. Monsanto further asserted that information derived from ESTs would be useful for eight specific types of research: as research probes, as molecular markers, to measure mRNA levels, as primers, to detect polymorphisms, to find promoters, to control expression levels or to locate genetic molecules of other organisms. Stressing that the utility threshold is not high, Monsanto argued that these eight uses met that threshold because ESTs are essentially research tools, whose utility derives from their use in research. In certain circumstances, Monsanto argued, ESTs are so useful that researchers are willing to pay to use them, creating a commercial market for ESTs.
The PTO disagreed, asserting that although the threshold is not high, a patent must provide more benefit to the public than Monsanto's application did. The PTO explained, "That an invention belongs to a class of things that are the subject of serious scientific investigation is not enough to meet the requirement. . . . [B] eing the object of scientific research is not sufficient; what is necessary is that the invention have a currently available specific and substantial use." The uses that Monsanto provided did not reach the legally required threshold of "currently available specific and substantial use" because those uses were merely "investigational tests that yield more compounds lacking practical uses"-so-called "use-testing." According to the PTO, the asserted uses were general uses of ESTs, but were not specifically demonstrated for the five ESTs in Monsanto's claim.
The significance of the case was clear at oral argument on May 3, 2005. The courtroom was full to capacity. Seth Waxman, who is considered to be among the country's premier Supreme Court and appellate advocates and who served as Solicitor General of the United States under President Clinton from 1997 to 2001, argued eloquently for Monsanto. Furthermore, the argument was allowed to proceed for more than an hour and a half, though having been scheduled for only 40 minutes. The three-judge panel posed questions around three main themes: the threshold for meeting the utility requirement, whether ESTs are analogous to other research tools and the relevance of a commercial market to utility. On September 7, 2005, a divided court issued a majority opinion and a dissenting opinion.
The majority
The utility threshold: currently available, substantial, and specific benefit. Both parties agreed that the utility threshold is not high. But how low is "not high"? Monsanto argued that the Board of Appeals applied a heightened utility standard. According to Monsanto, the threshold for utility merely requires that the invention not be frivolous. Any of the potential research uses provided in the Fisher application would qualify since these are not frivolous. The PTO argued for a higher threshold than Monsanto's-one requiring evidence of a substantial, specific benefit in currently available form.
To resolve the issue, the majority looked to judicial precedent and reiterated that patentable utility requires that a patent applicant provide some evidence that the claimed invention provide a substantial and specific benefit to the public in currently available form. According to the court, "substantial" means that "an application must show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply put, to satisfy the 'substantial' utility requirement, an asserted use must show that that claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public." To show "specific" utility, "an application must disclose a use which is not so vague as to be meaningless."
The court found that the PTO's Utility Examination Guidelines are in accord with controlling precedents. Thus, by applying the Utility Guidelines, the board did not announce a new, heightened standard for utility.
Fisher's application provided neither substantial nor specific utility for the ESTs. The PTO rejected Fisher's application because Fisher did not disclose any result of the potential research uses. Although Fisher provided a list of uses-as probes, to identify polymorphisms, to map genomes, Fisher failed to provide even one gene, polymorphism, or mapped location that was discovered using any of the ESTs. Such general disclosure of what might be found and how the ESTs could possibly be used, with no evidence that the ESTs are currently able to do so, did not satisfy the utility requirement.
ESTs are not analogous to microscopes. A controversial aspect of this case was whether there is a meaningful distinction between ESTs and other research tools. For example, Monsanto argued that a research tool such as a microscope and an EST are analogous because they are useful to generate data from samples having unknown properties. Since microscopes clearly meet the utility standard, so should ESTs. The majority, however, found Monsanto's analogy to be flawed. Whereas a microscope has specific benefit because it can magnify an object to immediately reveal its structure, ESTs can only be used to detect objects having the same structure as the EST itself without providing any information about the complete structure or function of the associated gene.
The majority likened Fisher's ESTs to the "research intermediates" and "object[s] of use-testing" of precedential court cases which lacked utility. They are compounds upon which a scientist could perform research, which may or may not yield anything useful. Such hypothetical uses are so general that they are essentially meaningless for patent purposes. They are not of current benefit to the public and thus, do not warrant patent protection.
Evidence of general commercial use does not provide utility for specific ESTs. According to Monsanto, the utility of their ESTs is confirmed by the existence of an enormous market directed to the sale and licensing of ESTs that correspond to genes of unknown function. Thus, if a commercial market exists for some ESTs, then the five ESTs must necessarily be useful. However, the PTO asserted that the existence of a commercial market for EST databases is no indication of utility for specific ESTs. They analogized buying access to EST databases to buying a raffle ticket: some ESTs might provide useful information; most will not.
Clarifying the matter, the majority noted that commercial use could be a consideration in assessing utility, but it was neither necessary nor sufficient. Furthermore, even if the evidence demonstrated commercial use of a claimed EST, that would not require the conclusion that the EST met the utility standard. In this case, Monsanto relied on the commercial use of "general EST databases," rather than on any commercial use of its five specific ESTs. Without any evidence of commercial use of its ESTs, this argument was of no avail to Monsanto.
The dissent
Although two judges in the majority upheld the PTO's Utility Guidelines, one judge dissented. Judge Randall Rader agreed with Monsanto that the claimed ESTs have sufficient utility as "research tools," though he sympathized with the PTO that its examiners lack any other effective standard for rejecting insubstantial discoveries. "Rather than distort the utility test," Rader argued, "the Patent Office should seek ways to apply the correct test, the test used world wide for such assessments (other than the United States), namely inventive step or obviousness" 11 .
Judge Rader distinguished Monsanto's case from the facts of Brenner and accused the majority of too quickly and without scientific evidence concluding that the information that might be obtained via the five ESTs was too "insubstantial" to merit patent protection. Use of ESTs in scientific research, noted Rader, is real enough to support patenting.
Judge Rader accepted Monsanto's analogy between ESTs and research tools, such as microscopes. According to him, they all possess utility, albeit limited to the laboratory setting as research tools useful in studying other compounds. Judge Rader argued that the majority failed to understand the complex nature of scientific discovery, and that under the majority's holding "only the final step of a lengthy incremental research inquiry gets protection."
The future of EST patenting The majority in the Fisher case would require patent applicants seeking to protect their ESTs to first identify the function of the underlying protein-encoding sequences. This might be accomplished by isolating and sequencing the associated coding sequences and discovering the function of the expressed protein.
Whether the utility requirement could be met with other evidence remains to be determined in subsequent cases. What is very clear from Fisher is that filing as soon as the EST is sequenced, as was the norm previously, is not sufficient. It is thus evident that many of the EST applications currently filed with the PTO will not meet the threshold for utility and will likely be abandoned. The ESTs disclosed within these applications (many of which have been published) will be available freely for use in research.
